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477; 50 A.L.R. 1450. It will be noted that the emphasis in the prin-
ciple case was placed upon the control element.
NOAH J. KERN
Appeal and Error
MOTION TO CERTIFY - EFFECT OF OVERRULING MOTION
STARE DECIsIs.
"The refusal of a motion to certify, even if the same legal question
is decisively involved, does not furnish an adjudication of the question by
this court as an established precedent for future cases." This unequivocal
language was used by the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio in the
recent case of Village of Brewster v. Hill. The circumstances of the
controversy calling forth this statement were that the capacity of a town
to contract under Article VIII, section 6 of the Ohio Constitution was
challenged by Hill, a taxpayer. The case of Nicol v. Tolhurst, Village
of ilmherst (unreported), decided by the Court of Appeals of Lorain
County in a pro forma opinion, was similar factually, and that court had
decided in favor of the Village. Counsel for the Village of Brewster
cited the Amherst case as authority for his position, since a motion to
certify had been overruled by the Supreme Court. The Court, however,
held in favor of Hill and against the Village. We may take it, then, as
an indisputable fact that overruling a motion to certify is not an affirm-
ance. Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 343, 19o N.E. 766,
40 O.L.B. 66 (i934).
At first blush, it would seem that this situation is highly contradic-
tory; two cases similar factually, yet having two opposing decisions upon
the question involved. In fact, however, there is no ambiguity. In ref-
erence to the law of Ohio generally, the Supreme Court has spoken, and
their word is the law. It would be well, however, for the lawyer to
keep the Amherst case in mind when before the Court of Appeals of
Lorain County.
A further instance of this principle is found in the words of Judge
Jones in The Cleveland Railroad Co. v. Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 42,
183 N.E. 873, 37 O.L.R. 337, 42 A.L.R. 15 (1932). "Various cases
involving the application of the 'last clear chance' rule have, from time
to time, appeared on the motion docket of the court, and in such cases
this court has generally given its sanction to the rule in Erie Railroad
Co. v. McCormdck, A4dm'x, 69 Ohio St. 45. A recent case knocking
at our doors for certification was Ross v. Hocking Valley Railroad Co.,
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reported by the Court of Appeals of the second district, in 40 Ohio App.
447, 178 N.E. 852, ii Abs. 487 (1931). We do not generally allude
to appellate opinions in our reported cases, but we shall refer to that
case because it discloses the attitude of this court upon the subject in
controversy." Judge Marshall, in his concurring opinion, says of the
Ross case, "It is true that this court overruled a motion to certify the
record. We must, however, protest against any opinion . . . . declar-
ing that the overruling of a motion to certify constitutes an adherence
'to the principle announced by the Appellate Court, otherwise it would
have admitted and reversed the case.' The contrary of that declaration
has been stated a score of times from the bench during the last few years,
and in at least one opinion the bar has been advised that theoverruling
of a motion to certify does not amount to any declaration of legal
principles." There can be no doubt as to exactly what the rule is in the
mind of the Supreme Court. Unless there is some drastic change, the
overruling of the motion can never be construed as an affirmance of the
lower court.
The practice in New York is very similar to that in Ohio. "A
denial by this court of a motion for leave to appeal from an order of
the Appellate Division affirming such an order is not equivalent to an
affirmance of the order. While, therefore, the order appeale from may
be binding as res adjudicata, it may not be held binding under the rule
of stare decisis." Further along in the same case the court makes the
following astounding statement: "A denial of a motion for leave to
appeal is not equivalent to an affirmance of the order thus withdrawn
from review. It does not give to the order the value of a precedent.
Motions for leave to appeal have the careful consideration of the judges
of the court, yet they lack the authority that attaches to a decision with
all the aid of argument. . . . Appellate divisions and trial courts are at
liberty, if the please, to give to such a refusal some measure of signifi-
cance, as a token, though indecisive, of the impressions of this court.
They are not bound thereby as by an authoritative precedent." This
statement on the part of the court indicates the lower courts may give
some slight weight to a refusal to review. This is the most liberal of
the views taken by any court that we have been able to discover. Matter
of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E.
386 (1929).
What we have said of the Supreme Court of Ohio, applies with
equal force to the Supreme Court of the United States. United States v.
Carver 260 U.S. 482, at 290 (1922).
"The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion
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upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times. There-
fore it is unnecessary to consider whether the libelant's argument is
supported by the decisions to which they refer." Here too, then, the
overruling of the motion has absolutely no effect upon later decisions,
and here they may not even be considered by the lower courts.
However, in Ohio there are various factors which help to build up
the impression that the strictness of this view is not shared by inferior
courts. In the case of The Cuyahoga Improvement Co. et al. v. Moore,
41 Ohio App. 30, 179 N.E. 501, 8 Abs. 148 (1929) the court cites
the case of Strangward v. American Brass Bedstead Co., 82 Ohio St.
121, 91 N.E. 988 (191o) as holding that a recovery for monthly
installments of rent, (that being all that was due at the time the action
was commenced) is not a bar to recovery for future instalments coming
due under the terms of the lease. This doctrine has been followed in
several cases, one being Gusman v. Mathews, 29 Ohio 163 N.E. 636
App. 402 (1928) which was considered by the Supreme Court on a
motion to certify, the motion being overruled. The Appellate Court in
the Cuyahoga case says: "referring to the Strangward case; "This case
has recently been approved and followed in two cases arising in this
county, one being that of Yerman v. Boccia, 6 O.L.A. 218, and the
other being the case of Gusman v. Mathews, 29 Ohio App. 402, 163
N.E. 636. This last case was considered by the Supreme Court of this
state upon a motion to certify, and on June 20, 1928, the motion to
certify was overruled. We, therefore, recognize that the Supreme Court
approves the Strangward case and the doctrine therein announced, and
such is now the law of Ohio."
Sometimes the Appellate Court cites another Appellate case and
merely states that a motion to certify has been overruled, without going
to the length of explanation that was found in the Cuyahoga case. This
means at least that the Appellate Court does give some weight to this
fact.
Further the Ohio Appellate Reporter, in the front of the book,
carries the later case history of cases reported, and Ohio Jurisprudence
carries footnotes to the same effect. These are further indications that
this information is regarded as being of value in determining the prob-
able attitude of the Supreme Court on a given question, by reason of
their action on a motion to certify.
All these things build up the impression that overruling a motion
to certify means more than merely that the Supreme Court refuses to
hear the case on its merits. We have no way of determining how often
the lawyer cites such material in his brief, but it must be done often. If
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the court itself cites such material with approval, it must be because the
lawyers are continually citing it to them. From this, we conclude that
it is probably good practice to cite such material to the courts of appeal,
but that it is very bad practice to cite the overruling of motions to certify
when before the Supreme Court.
The Ohio State Bar Association Report of the forty-seventh annual
meeting, held July sixth to July eighth, 1926, at page 248, sets out
the following resolution submitted to that body, "Be it resolved, that it
is the belief of the members of the Ohio State Bar Association here
assembled, that the Supreme Court of Ohio could expedite its work, aid
attorneys in their work, save much money for litigants and generally
promote the interests of justice, if when overruling motions to certify
the record and for leave to file petitions in error, it would render and
publish a short and concise opinion giving reasons for its rulings and the
vote of the members of the court thereupon." This resolution was
referred to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Re-
form. At the following Mid-Winter Meeting, the Committee approved
the resolution, after changing it to read: "Be it resolved, that it is the
opinion of the Ohio State Bar Association, that the Supreme Court of
Ohio, by making public the reasons for its action when overruling
motions to certify the record, and motions for leave to file petitions in
error, will generally promote the interests of justice and will furnish a
guide for future action by the bar; and we further express the belief
that the announcement of the vote of the members of the court on such
decisions is advisable."
These advantages would probably follow. But on the other hand,
such a plan would enormously burden an already burdened court. Even
if such opinions were short and concise, it would take considerably more
time than is consumed in passing the motion now. Secondly, having
opinions which are written tends to bind the court strictly. It seems
of doubtful benefit to hold the court strictly to an opinion on a question
which they have not investigated thoroughly. And if they must investi-
gate thoroughly, then there will be no ground for refusing to hear a
case, and every case knocking at the doors of the court, will be decided
upon the merits. Each decision on a motion to certify would be the
basis of stare decisis and a binding precedent. This would hinder any
change of opinion which might later be demanded by reason of a change
in circumstances. There is much to be said, then for leaving the court
free to act on a motion as it sees fit.
One of the jurisdictional requirements of the Supreme Court is
that the case be one of "public or great general interest." Shortly after
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this Constitutional provision was enacted, the case of .kron v. Roth,
88 Ohio St. 456, 103 N.E. 465 (1912), was decided. The Court in
that case said that not only need the case be one of "public or great
general interest," but also that error has probably intervened. Some
eight years later, (1920) the Court in ruling on a motion said, "over-
ruled, the Court finding that the case is one of public interest, but no
error has intervened." Records of the Supreme Cour , Case Number
I6,71o, journal 28, page 476, July I6, 192o.
This notation has not been repeated that we know of, but it is some
indication that the Court considers the factor of probable error when
passing on a motion to certify. It seems an inescapable conclusion that
this was in fact, for the particular case, at least, an aflirmance of the
lower court, for the Supreme Court admittedly had jurisdiction, because
the case was of "public or great general interest," but the Court refused
it because it thought that there was no error in the case.
This suggests that a milder reform might be to use formal reasons,
similar to these, in disposing of these motions. Thus perhaps the advan-
tages sought after by the Ohio Bar Ass'n. in its resolution, without the
attending disadvantages of binding precedent or excessive labor on the
part of the Court would be attained. In giving these reasons, the Court
would not be binding itself irrevocably to one position, for it would
merely be an indication of how the Court reacts to a given question
upon a cursory examination. And of course, the Court would not be
faced by the task of writing an opinion on the case, but could dispose of
the whole problem by designating a number of these reasons.
The problem clearly merits further study and thought by those
connected with the profession with a view to evolving a plan which will
satisfy both the judiciary and the bar.
CARL R. JOHNSON.
Automobiles
NEGLIGENCE - DOCTRINE OF ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE
AHEAD - STATUTE AS SUBJECTIVE TEST.
The defendant stopped his truck on the highway. The evidence
tended to show that there was no negligence in parking the truck but
that there was no tail light burning. The night was dark, rainy, and
foggy; the deceased was driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour and
had just met a car coming from the opposite direction. Under such
circumstances the deceased collided with the rear end of the truck and
